Voter Privacy

When it comes to tallying elections, the only place where information must be hidden is related to vote privacy – how a particular voter voted. This concept is canonically referred to as the Secret Ballot

  • Voter identity is not to be associated with their vote

  • Jurisdictional Voter Rolls also require privacy

System Security

  • Securing an EIP election system amounts to less of a cost and concern than with legacy systems because the focus is on the data produced, not the software used to produce it

  • Systems must provide security against for example, DOS and MIM attacks as in any other system using best practices, however

  • EIP Distributed Ledgers are not vulnerable to 51% attacks

  • Hacking is irrelevant. Suppose someone were able to somehow change your ballot. If so, you can easily find out when you retrieve it. Not to mention, the numbers wouldn't be consistent across all the DL network nodes. Busted!

  • Taking down a system with multiple distributed nodes is more difficult than that of a single centralized node

  • EIP Distributed Ledgers are fault tolerant

  • EIP tally systems are required to be able to produce an accurate distributed ledger of EIP Cast VoteRecords. That's about it

  • Code inspections and the like are an unnecessary waste of time and resources. Why?

  • Do you need to see the source code of your bank when they prepare your statements? How about your favorite calculator? No. All you care about is the result: The Ledger.
  • Think of this entire process like balancing a checkbook, but easier. All you need to do is locate your completed ballot from the ledger and you are good to go

None of your personal information is being collected, sold or distributed anywhere